

Message Text

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TO ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

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FOLLOWING SENT ACTION ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS

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SUBJECT: CUBA IN ANGOLA -- A HALF YEAR LATER

THE FOLLOWING IS AN ANALYSIS OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA,
A HALF YEAR AFTER THE MASSIVE AIR AND SEA LIFT OF AN
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO THAT COUNTRY.

1. CUBA'S INTERNATIONAL SITUATION--THE BALANCE SHEET

THE ANGOLA DECISION HAS BROUGHT CONSEQUENCES FIDEL COULD
NOT HAVE FORESEEN. CLEARLY CUBA'S POSTURE IN THE WORLD IS
IMPORTANTLY DIFFERENT TODAY THAN IT WAS A YEAR AGO:

-- FIDEL HAS WON TOP MARKS IN THE RADICAL PARTS OF THE
THIRD WORLD AS A REVOLUTIONARY LEADER.

-- CUBA IS SEEN IN AFRICA (AND THE BLACK CARIBBEAN) AS A
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MAJOR FACTOR IN PUTTING NEW MOMENTUM IN THE ANTI-COLONIAL
AND ANTI-WHITE STRUGGLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

-- CUBA IS NOW DEEPLY INTO THE BIG POWER GAME, HAVING

COLLABORATED WITH THE SOVIETS IN A LIBERATION MOVEMENT

AND OUTMANEUVERED US IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

-- THE POPULAR IMAGE OF CUBA AND FIDEL WORLD-WIDE HAS PROBABLY TAKEN ANOTHER LEAP FORWARD--AS HIS FORCES ARE SEEN AS BOLD, EFFECTIVE AND VICTORIOUS.

BUT THESE ARE LARGELY PSYCHOLOGICAL GAINS. THE ANGOLA ADVENTURE HAS RESULTED IN MORE PROBLEMS FOR FIDEL THAN HE COUNTED ON:

-- THE CUBANS MAY WELL BE BOGGED DOWN IN A COMPLEX CIVIL STRIFE IN ANGOLA FOR MONTHS OR EVEN YEARS.

-- THE COSTS DIPLOMATICALLY HAVE BEEN EVIDENT. LATIN GOVERNMENTS HAVE COOLED NOTICEABLY TOWARD CUBA. THE EUROPEANS AND JAPANESE ARE SLOWING UP THEIR CREDITS -- SLOWLY, BUT PERCEPTABLY.

-- CUBA ALSO NO LONGER CAN COUNT ON THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT TO RATIFY ITS EVERY WHIM. IN THE RECENT ALGIERS NON-ALIGNED MEETING, CUBA WAS UNABLE TO MUSTER SUPPORT FOR A RESOLUTION SUPPORTING ITS ANGOLA ACTION.

-- FIDEL IS SEEN BY MANY GOVERNMENTS AS SOVIET SURROGATE --INCREASINGLY A TOADY TO SOVIET POWER. PROBABLY AN INACCURATE PICTURE, IT INFURIATES FIDEL BUT HAS ENOUGH TRUTH TO IT TO AFFECT HIS POSTURING.

-- ECONOMICALLY, CUBA IS AS DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIETS AS BEFORE. THEY WILL HAVE A \$850 MILLION TRADE DEFICIT THIS YEAR, \$575 MILLION OF IT FROM THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD. IF WESTERN CREDITORS CLOSE THEIR FISTS THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO STEP IN WITH MORE AID OR CUBA WILL HAVE TO TIGHTEN ITS BELT.

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FIDEL'S OPTIONS HAVE NARROWED. HE CAN NO LONGER PLAY HIS FOUR-CORNERED FOREIGN POLICY (COMMUNIST, THIRD WORLD RADICAL, LATIN AMERICAN, AND ACCOMMODATOR WITH INDUSTRIAL NATIONS) SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE ANGOLA ACTION HAS MADE HIM LESS SURE-FOOTED.

2. HOW DOES CASTRO SEE IT HIMSELF?

IN WHAT MAY BE AN ALL-TIME CLASSIC IN ANTI-AMERICAN INVECTIVE, AND USING THE OCCASION OF THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE BAY OF PIGS, CASTRO GAVE A DETAILED PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION

ON APRIL 19 FOR CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA.

THE POINT OF GREATEST SIGNIFICANCE WAS CASTRO'S DEFENSIVE ATTEMPT TO REFUTE THE IMAGE OF BEING MOSCOW'S SURROGATE IN ANGOLA. HE SAID:

"CUBA'S DECISION WAS MADE ABSOLUTELY UNDER ITS OWN RESPONSIBILITY. THE USSRNEVER REQUESTED THE SENDING OF CUBANS TO THAT COUNTRY. THE USSR IS EXTRAORDINARILY RESPECTFUL IN ITS RELATIONS WITH CUBA. A DECISION OF THIS NATURE COULD ONLY BE MADE BY OUR OWN PARTY."

IT WAS IN THE PASSAGES FOLLOWING THESE SENTENCES THAT CASTRO CALLED PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER LIARS.

THE SAME SENSITIVITIES CROPPED UP IN THE CONVERSATIONS THAT A WESTERN AMBASSADOR HAD WITH CARLOS RAPHAEL RODRIGUEZ AND CASTRO IN HAVANA IN LATE APRIL. AND THERE APPEARS TO BE AN ORCHESTRATED--AND SELF-SERVING--EFFORT BY SOVIET TO BUTTRESS THE POINTS THAT THE CUBANS MADE THE DECISION TO GO INTO ANGOLA THEMSELVES,

AND THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SURPRISED AND CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES. THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO SPREADING THE WORD AROUND THAT ANGOLA WAS A UNIQUE SITUATION.

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WHY SUCH A THIN-SKIN ABOUT THE MERCENARY CHARGE, WHEN AS RECENTLY AS DECEMBER 1975 CASTRO WAS TELLING HIS PARTY CONGRESS THAT CUBAN HELP TO THE MPLA WAS CARRYING OUT A PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALIST RESPONSIBILITY, JUST AS THE USSR HAD CARRIED OUT SUCH A RESPONSIBILITY TO CUBA IN THE 1960'S? THE CHARGE UNDOUBTEDLY OFFENDS CUBAN NATIONALISTS AT HOME, MAKING IT APPEAR THAT THERE IS A PRICE TAG FOR SOVIET ECONOMIC AID. IT ALSO RAISES THE DOUBT THAT ALL THAT SOVIET AID WAS NOT FOR CUBA'S INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT BUT TO MAKE CUBA A CAT'S PAW WITH SHARPER CLAWS.

CASTRO IS AWARE OF THE DAMAGE THE MERCENARY CHARGE CAN DO TO HIS NON-ALIGNED CREDENTIALS IN LATIN AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE--A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT CONCERN ON THE EVE OF THE SRI LANKA NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT. A SENIOR CARIBBEAN DIPLOMAT HAS TOLD US FIDEL MAY NOT ATTEND THIS MEETING. IS IT BECAUSE HE FEARS FOR HIS PERSONAL SECURITY AS OUR SOURCE CLAIMED; OR HE IS UNSURE ABOUT GETTING AN

ENDORSEMENT OF HIS ANGOLAN POLICY?

NOT THE LEAST OF CASTRO'S CONCERNS IS THAT THE MOST VICIOUS AND COLORFUL ATTACKS ON HIS ANGOLA ADVENTURE EMANATE FROM PEKING.

3. INTERVENTION POLICIES

ANOTHER MAJOR FEATURE CUBA'S RECENT INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN TO ATTEMPT TO QUIET FEARS OF FURTHER CUBAN INTERVENTIONS. ON APRIL 19 FIDEL SAID:

"NO LATIN COUNTRY, WHATEVER ITS SOCIAL SYSTEM MAY BE, WILL HAVE TO FEAR ANYTHING FROM THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES -- NO COUNTRY OF BLACK AFRICA HAS ANYTHING TO FEAR OF CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL."

OF COURSE, POTENTIAL AFRICAN TARGETS - NAMIBIA, RHODESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA - ARE AMBIGUOUSLY EXCLUDED FROM THIS ASSURANCE.

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IN APRIL CONVERSATIONS WITH A WESTERN AMBASSADOR IN HAVANA BOTH RODRIGUEZ AND CASTRO GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT CUBAN TROOPS WOULD NOT BE SENT INTO NAMIBIA OR RHODESIA. RODRIGUEZ SAID:

-- CUBAN TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM ANGOLA BY PHASES BEGINNING SOON.

-- CUBA WOULD NOT EVEN PROVIDE WEAPONS TO SWAPO IN NAMIBIA, ALTHOUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW WOULD PERMIT IT.

-- NETO WANTED A PERIOD OF CALM IN ANGOLA TO CONSOLIDATE;

-- CASTRO DID NOT WISH TO EXACERBATE CUBAN-US RELATIONS SIGNIFICANTLY; BUT,

-- CASTRO COULD NOT MAKE HIS INTENTIONS PUBLIC IN THE FACE OF US THREATS.

RODRIGUEZ' PRESS CONFERENCE AND PRIVATE MEETING WITH ANOTHER SENIOR WESTERN OFFICIAL IN LATE MAY TRIED TO GET ACROSS THE POINT THAT CUBA IS NOT ABOUT TO REPEAT IN RHODESIA WHAT IT DID IN ANGOLA. HE COULD NOT SAY CATEGORICALLY THAT CUBA WOULD NOT SUPPORT A "NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT" IN AFRICA BECAUSE THAT WOULD CONTRADICT THE PUBLISHED PROGRAM OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY. WHAT HE SEEMED TO BE SAYING--AND HERE IT MUST

BE BORNE IN MIND THAT RODRIGUEZ WAS SEEKING A LARGE LOAN FROM THE COUNTRY CONCERNED--WAS THAT CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN RHODESIA WOULD BE MODEST AND CAUTIOUS.

THE CASTRO MESSAGE TO PALME SAID THAT CUBAN TROOPS ARE NOW BEING TAKEN HOME AT A RATE OF 200 MEN PER WEEK. THE RATE WILL INCREASE IN THE FUTURE WITH THE GOAL OF TAKING OUT HALF THE TROOPS BY THE END OF THE YEAR. NEXT YEAR THERE WILL ONLY BE "A FEW" LEFT. CASTRO SAID THE GOAL OF CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA TODAY IS TO CONSOLIDATE THE MPLA AND GUARANTEE THE COUNTRY'S INDEPENDENCE. CUBA IS ALSO GIVING ANGOLA TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND MILITARY EDUCATION AS WELL AS LEGAL ADVICE FOR SETTING UP MILITARY TRIBUNALS

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WHICH SHALL JUDGE THE "ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION."

FIDEL'S BROTHER, RAUL, TOLD THE FRENCH IN HAVANA THAT CUBA WOULD WITHDRAW 250 TROOPS FROM ANGOLA PER WEEK AND THAT IT HAD 20,000 MEN THERE. USING RAUL'S FIGURES THERE WOULD STILL BE 7,000 MEN IN ANGOLA AFTER A YEAR OF WITHDRAWALS, A SIZABLE NUMBER IF ONE RECALLS THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN STRIKE FORCE IN ANGOLA LAST YEAR NEVER EXCEEDED 2,000 MEN. WE HAVE HAD NO INTELLIGENCE CONFIRMATION YET OF ANY NET WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA. THE CUBAN PEOPLE HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN THESE FIGURES NOR TOLD THAT FIGHTING CONTINUES IN ANGOLA.

THE PRIVATE STATEMENTS OF FIDEL, RAUL, AND RODRIGUEZ OF COURSE ARE DISINGENUOUS AND CERTAINLY WERE INTENDED TO BE PASSED ON TO THE US GOVERNMENT. BUT WHAT THEY ADD UP TO MAY BE ACCEPTANCE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF US WARNING, PRESSURE FROM MOSCOW TO COOL IT IN SOUTH AFRICA, AND RECOGNITION THAT CUBAN TROOPS CAN NOT BE WITHDRAWN ON ANY LARGE SCALE IN THE NEAR FUTURE FROM ANGOLA WITHOUT A RISK OF HEIGHTENED FACTIONALISM IN THE MPLA, BREAK-DOWN OF PUBLIC ORDER, OR POSSIBLY EVEN A RESUMPTION OF CIVIL WAR. THESE POSSIBILITIES ARE SUPPORTED BY OUR OWN INTELLIGENCE REPORTS.

4. NO END IN SIGHT

TO EXTRACT THE CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FROM ANGOLA MAY PROVE DIFFICULT FOR CASTRO.

THE CUBANS CAN NOT REMAIN FOR LONG IN ANGOLA WITHOUT ACQUIRING SOME STIGMA OF COLONIALISM--DOING FOR THE NATIVES WHAT THEY CANNOT DO THEMSELVES. AND, HOWEVER LOUDLY FIDEL DENIES IT, THIS IS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF EXPORTING REVOLUTIONS WITH SOVIET HELP. CASTRO'S SPEECH

IN CONAKRY--ON THE WAY BACK FROM THE MOSCOW PARTY CONGRESS IN MARCH--SUGGESTED THAT HE MAY TRY TO PHASE IN SUBSTITUTE AFRICAN TROOPS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE A COHESIVE INTERNATIONAL FORCE FROM RADICAL AFRICAN NEIGHBORING

COUNTRIES SUBSTITUTING FOR THE CUBANS. WHEN IT WAS ALL
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OVER WOULD ANGOLA REMAIN "SOCIALIST" OR FALL APART INTO
TRIBAL STRIFE, INVOLVING TRIBES IN COUNTRIES LIKE ZAIRE,
WHICH ARE NOT RADICALS. THESE ARE PROBLEMS CASTRO FACES.

5. WHAT ARE CUBA'S DIPLOMATIC COSTS?

IN RECENT YEARS CASTRO HAS SUCCESSFULLY PURSUED A FOUR-
TRACK FOREIGN POLICY OF CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH MOSCOW,
OF ACTIVISM IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE THIRD
WORLD, OF REINTEGRATION INTO THE HEMISPHERE--BOTH IN
LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN CONTEXTS, AND OF ACCOMMO-
DATIONS WITH EUROPE, JAPAN AND EVEN THE US FOR ECONOMIC
OBJECTIVES. NOW THERE ARE SIGNS THAT, FOR THE FIRST
TIME SINCE THE FOUR-TRACK POLICY WAS INITIATED, CASTRO IS
ENCOUNTERING DIFFICULTIES ON THE HEMISPHERIC TRACK,
POSSIBLY SLOWING DOWN ON THE NON-ALIGNED, AND SOME
POTENTIALLY COSTLY SETBACKS WITH THE DEVELOPED WORLD.

THE DIPLOMATIC COST OF ANGOLA MAY BE CONSIDERABLE.
SOME RIGHT-WING LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS NEVER DROPPED
THEIR OBJECTIONS TO CASTRO, BUT THEY WERE IN A DISTINCT
MINORITY BEFORE ANGOLA. NOW MANY MORE LATIN AMERICANS ARE WARY.
THE FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS ARE ILLUSTRATIVE:

-- THE JUNE AMPHICTYONIC CONFERENCE IN PANAMA WAS
CALLED OFF BECAUSE THE VENEZUELAN AND COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENTS PERCEIVED
THAT CASTRO'S PRESENCE WOULD ABORT THIS EXERCISE IN
SOLIDARITY BEFORE IT BEGAN. PERU WENT ALONG WITH THE
DECISION -- ITSELF A STRAW IN THE WIND.

-- A NUMBER OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES CONSIDERING
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA, INCLUDING COSTA RICA, HAVE
DECIDED NOT TO PROCEED. ELEMENTS WITHIN THE NEW ARGENTINE
JUNTA ARE LOOKING FOR A PRETEXT TO SEVER DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH HAVANA.

-- VENEZUELA HAS SUSPENDED CUBAN AIRLINE FLIGHTS AND
BROKEN OFF NEGOTIATIONS TO BUY CUBAN SUGAR.

-- MOST LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING EVEN MEXICO,
NOW EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT CUBAN INTERVENTION OFF-THE-
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RECORD, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY NOT BE WILLING TO ADMIT TO
ALARM IN PUBLIC.

-- IN THE CARIBBEAN, BOTH MANLEY AND BURHAM REMAIN UNDER

CASTRO'S SPELL AND BOTH ARE INVOLVED IN EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH CUBA HAVING SECURITY IMPLICATIONS. BUT MANLEY AT LEAST HAS DEEMED IT PRUDENT TO PUT OFF A CASTRO VISIT TO JAMAICA ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR MAY, PROBABLY UNTIL AFTER THE JAMAICAN ELECTIONS EARLY NEXT YEAR. BY CONTRAST, PRIME MINISTER WIL.IAMS HAS PUBLICLY CRITICIZED CUBAN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA AS PRESUMPTUOUS AND AS CREATING PROBLEMS FOR CUBA AT HOME.

-- IN TOKYO LAST MONTH RODRIGUEZ FAILED TO GET A JAPANESE COMMITMENT OF CREDITS NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT CUBA'S FIVE-YEAR PLAN.

-- CASTRO YIELDED TO CANADIAN PRESSURE TO TRANSFER THE ICNAF CONFERENCE FROM HAVANA TO MONTREAL. SURELY THIS WAS A BITTER DRAUGHT FOR FIDEL AND FOR THE RUSSIANS.

IN VIENNA LAST SPRING CUBA WAS ELECTED A VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNDP AS A MEMBER OF THE LATIN AMERICAN GROUP. WHEN WE CHALLENGED THIS ON THE GROUNDS THAT CUBA WAS A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES GROUP, WE WERE SUPPORTED BY UN LEGAL OPINION. THE LATIN AMERICANS THEREUPON WITHDREW THEIR SUPPORT OF CUBA'S ELECTION, WHICH WAS THEN INVALIDATED. MINOR IN ITSELF, THIS INCIDENT HIGHLIGHTS THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN CUBA'S ADHERENCE TO THE SOVIET VOTING BLOC IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ITS EASY READMITTANCE TO THE LATIN AMERICAN UN CAUCUS IN 1974 WHEN THE CONSENSUS OPTED FOR CUBAN REINTEGRATION INTO THE HEMISPHERE IN THE HOPE OF EVENTUALLY WEANING FIDEL AWAY FROM MOSCOW.

6. THE OTHER PERSPECTIVE

DESPITE THESE SETBACKS AND POSSIBLY MORE TO FOLLOW, CUBA'S PRESTIGE HAS RISEN IN THE HEMISPHERE, ALONG WITH NEW FEARS OF ITS POWER. THE INCLINATION OF A NUMBER OF
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WESTERN COUNTRIES TO DO BUSINESS AS USUAL HAVE NOT BEEN HELPFUL IN THAT REGARD. TRUDEAU'S VISIT TO HAVANA IN JANUARY IS A GLARING EXAMPLE. CUBA HAS ALSO BEEN HELPED BY BRAZIL'S AMBIGUOUS ROLE IN ANGOLA, BY THE STRONG INTEREST OF VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA IN PREVENTING CUBA FROM BEING RETURNED TO THE HEMISPHERIC AGENDA, AND NOT LEAST BY MEXICO'S HABIT OF BEING ALL THINGS TO ALL POWERS.

TO CUBA THE DIPLOMATIC SETBACKS MAY BE MORE THAN OFFSET BY ITS DEMONSTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY REACH. AS A COMMUNIST COUNTRY, IT IS BARELY 15 YEARS OLD AND DIPLOMATIC LOSSES MAY NOT WEIGH AS HEAVILY AS WITH THE 59 YEAR-OLD SOVIET UNION.

MOREOVER, THE CUBAN "DISCIPLINED" SOCIAL ORDER ATTRACTS MANLEY AND BURHAM. IT COULD IN TIME ATTRACT OTHER,(EVEN ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE BLACK CARIBBEAN. CUBA IS SO DRAB AND REGIMENTED THAT IT SEEMS SOMEWHAT "UN-LATIN" TO CURRENT LEADERS LIKE ECHEVERRIA AND TORRIJOS. THE RULING CASTES THEY REPRESENT STILL WANT TO DRIVE FAST, GET TO THE OFFICE LATE, AND CHEAT ON THEIR TAXES. BUT AS TIME GOES ON, NEW WAVES OF VISITORS TO CUBA WILL BE IMPRESSED BY THE CLEAN STREETS OF HAVANA, THE LACK OF STREET CRIME, DRUGS, AND GRINDING POVERTY. THIS FEATURE OF CUBA HAS BEEN RELATIVELY UNTOUCHED BY THE ANGOLAN VENTURE. BUT ULTIMATELY THE CARIBBEANS AND LATINS KNOW THAT CUBAN "ORDER" HAS COST THE SOVIETS A PRETTY PENNY. NEITHER THE SOVIETS NOR ANYONE ELSE SEEMS INCLINED TO PICK UP THE TAB OF THAT SIZE TO CREATE ANOTHER MODEL IN THE CARIBBEAN.

7. ACTION:

ADDRESSEES ARE NOT ENCOURAGED TO SEEK OUT DEBATE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS OR DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES WHETHER OR NOT CUBAN TROOPS ARE OR ARE NOT BEING WITHDRAWN FROM ANGOLA TO ANY MEANINGFUL EXTENT. BUT THE ISSUE AT STAKE IS A MAJOR ONE AND DEPARTMENT BELIEVES ADDRESSEES CAN HELP MOULD INTERNATIONAL OPINIONS IN THE COMING MONTHS BY TAKING THE FOLLOWING LINE IF THE SUBJECT IS RAISED BY OTHERS:

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-- EXPRESS SKEPTICISM ABOUT FIDEL'S ANNOUNCED PLANS TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM ANGOLA BY POINTING OUT THAT HE SEEMS BOGGED DOWN AND THAT EVEN IF HE WITHDRAWS SOME TROOPS, HE WILL PROBABLY STILL HAVE 7-10,000 THERE AT THE END OF THIS YEAR;

-- STATE THAT WE HOPE FIDEL MEANS WHAT HE SAYS ABOUT WITHDRAWAL AND NO FURTHER INTERVENTIONS, BUT POINT OUT THAT HIS STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN VAGUE AND HIS PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ASSURANCES THUS FAR SEEM DESIGNED FOR DIPLOMATIC EFFECT ON THE OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SRI LANKA SUMMIT CONFERENCE; AND,

-- URGE OTHER ACTIVE THIRD WORLD GOVERNMENTS (PARTICULARLY THOSE ATTENDING THE SRI LANKA CONFERENCE) TO OBJECT TO RESOLUTIONS GIVING INTERNATIONAL APPROVAL OF CUBAN INTERVENTIONIST POLICIES. KISSINGER UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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